The surge in academic work on globalization has made several of the topics dear to authors of the dependency school relevant once again. Therefore a reconsideration of dependency theory seems to be appropriate. There are at least two approaches to dependency. This paper analyzes critically their similarities, differences and limitations, in particular regarding the role of technology, and international finance in the explanation of center and periphery interactions. The evolutions of the ideas on dependency in Latin America are evaluated. The reduced relevance of strict definitions of the technological division of labor, and the theoretical problems caused by the effective industrialization of several countries in the periphery, the debt crisis, and the failure of the neoliberal agenda are also discussed. In the era of globalization and great transformations in the international economy the 'new' dependency seems to be financial in nature.
INTRODUCTION
Dependency theory has almost disappeared from the academic curricula -in the US at least. 1 The reasons are varied and beyond the scope of this paper, although it is clear that the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent enthusiasm for market friendly development strategies are prominent causes of the disappearance of dependency from academic programs of study. On the other hand, the surge in academic work on globalization has made several of the topics dear to authors of the dependency school relevant once again. Therefore a reconsideration of dependency theory seems to be appropriate.
There are two dependency theory traditions, namely: the American-Marxist developed by Baran, Sweezy and Gunder Frank, with The paper is divided in three sections. The following section describes the differences between the two dependency theory traditions, in particular regarding the importance of external and internal forces in the dependency relation. Then, the similarities between the two traditions and their limitations are discussed in light of the process of globalization. In particular the supply side view of the development process, that has technology as it focal point, is criticized. The role of financial dependency and its importance in the process of development is emphasized. Financial liberalization and the poor performance in the 1990s
have highlighted the role of the balance of payments as the main constraint to
growth. An alternative interpretation of dependency relations, one in which the role of international financial markets rather then technological change, is considered.
THE NEO-MARXIST APPROACH
Traditional Marxist authors -and Marx himself -argued that the developed Nation showed the underdeveloped one the path to be followed. In Rostowian fashion underdeveloped countries would pass the same stages of development and eventually become fully industrialized. Albert Hirschman referred to this view 5 Not surprisingly several dependency authors see Schumpeter and the Schumpeterian literature in positive light. The process of development is related then to the role of the entrepreneur. Cardoso (1964) for example argues that the weakness of a dynamic national entrepreneurial class -a national bourgeoisie -is part of the explanation for Brazilian backwarderness. 6 We will not discuss distinctions between growth and development, but it should be clear that GDP per capita growth is only one component of development. The Brazilian economic miracle with high rates of GDP growth (more than 10 percent per year) and increasing income inequality comes to mind as an example of growth that does not translate into development.
as mono-economism, that is, the idea that only one path of development exists.
Paul Baran (1957) was certainly a break with that tradition. 7 Baran divided the world into advanced capitalist economies and underdeveloped economies, emphasizing, as much as Latin American structuralists had before, the interrelation between development and underdevelopment processes in a worldcentered approach. 8 The origins of the center-periphery relation are strictly technological and determined by the international division of labor. In other words, the center produces manufactured goods for itself and the periphery and the periphery produces commodities mainly for the center, while maintaining a relatively big subsistence system.
Baran explained the lack of dynamism in the underdeveloped world as being a result of the particular insertion in the world economy. The process of development for Baran depends on capital accumulation, which, in turn, hinges on surplus extraction. 9 A higher surplus leads to higher accumulation of capital and growth. According to Baran (1957, p. 164) it is in the uses of the surplus that the differences between developed and underdeveloped regions are more 7 Palma (1978, p. 1) suggests "Marxist interest in the problems of capitalism development in peripheral countries and areas of the world only began in 1957, with the publication of Baran's
The Political Economy of Growth." Palma (1978) , one should note, emphasizes the role of the American Marxist tradition -or more simply the Marxist tradition -rather than the Latin American Structuralist one. Emphasis on the latter would make Mariátegui (1928 ), Caio Prado (1942 ), or Bagú (1949 He does quote Hans Singer, and some other structuralist authors, in passing. 9 Surplus is defined as the difference of output and necessary consumption. The difference between actual and potential surplus is here ignored. It should also be noted that Baran's heuristic model presupposes that investment depends on surplus (profits). This assumption is markedly different than the Keynesian and Kaleckian notion of autonomous spending determining income. It also, one might add, quite different from the underconsumptionist approach to Marx of Baran and Sweezy (1966) .
evident. In the most backward countries, where the process of industrialization did not take a hold, and agriculture is still dominant, Baran suggests that underdevelopment results from the patterns of land tenure.
The predominance of large states in plantation systems implies that a great part of the surplus ends with landowners, which emulates the patterns of consumption of developed countries. Excessive and superfluous consumption on luxuries would then reduce the potential for investment and capital accumulation.
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Hence, conspicuous consumption would be the culprit of stagnation in the periphery. 11 The international division of labor that promoted the export oriented plantation system in a good part of the developing world, and reinforced the need for luxury imports is then a t the core of the dependency relation. However, industrial development is quite possible in the periphery as Baran clearly knew, and in that case a new pattern of dependency would emerge. Baran (1957, p. 175) Baran (1957, p. 168) was, however, rather strikingly against agrarian reform, since in his view a Nation constituted of small agricultural unities would be unproductive. See also Brewer (1980, p. 155) . 11 A similar argument was put forward by Furtado (1972) . Furtado argued that while the dynamic element in the center was technical progress, in the periphery the dynamic role was taken by the consumer demand patterns. The imitation of patterns of consumption from the center that could not be sustained by the level of technological development in the periphery was the main cause of stagnation in the latter. 12 Baran's discussion on foreign capital precedes and to some extent foreshadows Hymer and
Kindleberger's discussion of the multinational corporation.
periphery then jumps into the monopolistic phase of capitalistic development.
However, the surplus extracted by the monopolistic capital is not reinvested in productive activities in the host country. 13 Part of it is simply sent abroad to the parent company as profit remittances to placate their foreign stockholders, while the other part is spent on conspicuous consumption in the manner of the landed aristocracy. 14 Baran concluded then that the only way to break with the circle of dependency would be a political revolution.
André Gunder Frank (1967) Yeldan (1995) and Somel (2003) . 14 An additional cause of stagnation in the periphery is related to the nature of monopoly capital, in similar fashion to stagnation in the core. Baran believes -in contradistinction to Schumpeterthat oligopolistic market structures tend to slow down the innovative efforts of corporations, and reduce the incentives to invest. For a discussion of Baran and surplus theorizing in general see Lippit (1985) . 15 Palma (1978, pp. 24-25) The second criticism, and the more important one for our purposes, came from what was referred to as the Latin American-Structuralist camp of dependency, and was directed towards the notion of the impossibility of industrial development in the periphery. The stagnationist thesis -initially defended, but later recanted,
by Furtado (1969) too -presumed that the process of import substitution industrialization had reached its limits. Cardoso and Faletto (1967) and more emphatically Tavares and Serra (1970) would produce a definite refutation, and facts would prove them right, to a certain extent. 17 The effective industrial development of the periphery implied that the extreme pessimistic view of the American-Marxist approach was, at best, exaggerated. Cardoso and Faletto (1967) , although critical of Cepalist generalizations, and for that reasons defenders of the analysis of concrete experiences, were, in fact, revising and extending the Cepalist approach to development; not the least because their work was written at CEPAL. Not only is capitalism development in the periphery possible, according to Cardoso and Faletto, but also foreign capital 16 Dos Santos (2002, p. 30) notes that Frank correctly follows Bagú and Caio Prado against orthodox Marxists in arguing that there was no feudal past in Latin America. Dos Santos (2002, pp. 53-58) also notes the connection between the neo-Marxist approach to dependency and the world systems literature emphasis on external forces. 17 For the stagnationist debate see Lustig (1980) and more recently Goldenstein (1994) .
THE STRUCTURALIST APPROACH
has a tendency to re-investment in the host country so that foreign investment may in fact crowd in domestic investment. 18 Hence, the nature of dependency is such that partial or dependent development is viable.
As result, dependency is not a relationship between commodity exporters and industrialized countries, but one between countries with different degrees of industrialization. Furthermore, Cardoso and Faletto brand of dependency distinguishes two dichotomies that allow classifying the political and economic situation of a given country. Development and underdevelopment remain an economic category essentially related to the degree of development of the productive structure, and, hence, to its level of technological development. On the other hand, dependency and autonomy refer to the degree of development of the political structure, and the ability or not of local political elites to take economic decision making into its own hands. As a result, dependent development in association with foreign capital was possible and did occur, according to Cardoso, in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, and in a good part of East Asia, one might add. 19 Arguably, these would be the countries that correspond to what Wallerstein (1979) refers to as the semi-periphery.
18 Cardoso and Faletto (1967, p. 41 ) talk of solidarity between foreign investment and domestic expansion. In modern terms one would refer to crowding in, that is, the idea that linkages promoted by foreign investment lead to increasing domestic capital formation. For measures of crowding in Brazil see Vernengo (2003b) , for a more broad empirical coverage see Agosin and Mayer (2000) , who found crowding in Asia, and crowding out in Latin America.
19 Halliday (2002, p. 83) argues that critics of the American Marxists tradition like Cardoso got it right, since "industrialization, and economic growth in general, have been possible in a range of peripheral countries and on a scale that dependency theory did not envisage." Sutcliffe (2002, pp. 50-51) also criticizes the rigidity of the American Marxist tradition, in particular "its inability to account for those developments which have not simply been a continuation of North-South polarization, for instance the extraordinarily rapid capitalist industrialization of a number of Asian countries during the last forty years."
Cardoso and Faletto emphasized the importance of domestic internal developments, in contrast to the external forces of the world economy, as the main determinant of the situation of dependency. It is the internal political process that leads to outcomes that favor foreign actors in the process of development. Further, national capitalist development is not incompatible with the absorption of technological knowledge from multinational firms. Arguably if the goal is to achieve development, dependent development is a reasonable road to it, even if autonomous development is politically more interesting.
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For that reason, Cardoso and Faletto were among the first to note that stagnation was not inevitable for Latin America, and that growth could in fact resume after the cyclical crisis of accumulation that followed the wave of investments of the developmentalist policies of the 1950s. 21 Tavares and Serra (1970) formalized the idea and showed that income redistribution to the higher income groups -de facto creating an upper middle-income class in Brazil -had allowed the so-called Brazilian Miracle. Tavares and Serra also argued that chronic instability would come together with the recovery as a result of the lack of capacity to generate domestically endogenous technical progress. In that respect, they hint that more than mere transfer of technology from the center, Latin American countries should be able to generate their own dynamics of technological innovation, what later neo-Schumpeterian authors would refer to as a National System of Innovation. 20 In that sense, one may interpret Cardoso's administration (1995 Cardoso's administration ( -2002 alignment with the liberalizing policies of the Washington Consensus as the recognition that autonomous development was not possible for Brazil, and that dependent development was the only alternative. See Fiori (1997) and Rocha (2003) for arguments along those lines, and for similar early critiques of the Lula administration see Oliveira (2003) , and Vernengo (2003a) . 21 O'Donnell (1982) argued that the political constraints to dependent development were lifted by the military coups in Latin America that came to promote development in authoritarian guise.
Bureaucratic authoritarian rule would do what liberal democracy was unable to accomplish.
The importance of technology, the role of multinationals in the process of technology transfer, and the role of the State in promoting technological innovation through industrial policy then became the focus of the Latin American
Structuralists. The specific historical conditions of development of different stiles of capitalism in the periphery become part of the agenda of research. 22 The main difficulty as seen by the Latin American approach to dependency was taken from the old structuralists, and was associated to the hard phase of import substitution, that is, the implementation of a domestic capital goods sector. In particular, the need for import of capital goods would imply that the balance of payments could impose a serious constraint to economic growth.
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Policies that would enhance systemic competitiveness in international markets were seen as the main tool to promote development. 24 The preoccupation shifts (1983) . 23 An idea that was also dear to Cambridge Keynesians and that is alive in the post-Keynesian tradition (e.g. Davidson, 1990 The implicit diagnostic is that although development had been possible, import substitution was unable to eliminate the structural heterogeneity of the productive structure, or to diversify the exports in the region. The lack of a proper export General to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to defend a more important role for export promotion in the process of development (Bielschowsky, 1998) .
Also, countries like Brazil had moved by the late 1960s towards an export oriented strategy.
Hence, the idea that ISI was still the dominant strategy on the verge of the debt crisis seems inaccurate to say the least.
Latin America had caught up with the central countries, the region stagnated in the two decades that followed.
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More than the lack of technological dynamism of the import substitution industrialization, or the perverse composition of demand, or the lack of dynamism of its elites, all of which are emphasized by neo-structuralists, what the debt crisis revealed was a considerable degree of financial dependence. clear by now that the Washington Consensus policies were not effective and that low growth equilibrium still prevails in the region. 27 In fact, Dani Rodrik (1999, p. 71) argues that "contrary to received wisdom, ISI-driven growth did not produce tremendous inefficiencies on an economywide scale. In fact, the productivity performance of many Latin American and Middle Eastern countries was, in comparative perspective, exemplary."
Bretton Woods. The oil shocks and the cost pressures that followed implied that initially real interest rates were negative. However, that was but a short-term accident. Overall interest rates have been on average higher in the post-Bretton Woods period than during the so-called Golden Age period, that is, the postWorld War II period up to 1973.
In the late 1970s Paul Volcker, the then chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, hiked interest rates. Real interest rate became strongly positive, and remained so for a long period. Smithin (1996) refers to the interest rate shock as the revenge of the rentier. That is, the rentier class that was under attack during the Bretton Woods period -which ultimately had imposed Keynes' euthanasia of the rentier -was able to impose higher rates of remuneration at the expense of the Davidson (1982) argues that the U.S. dollar represents the asset of ultimate redemption, and hence is used as the measure of international liquidity.
As a result the U.S. benefits from a more liberal financial system, since the centrality of U.S. financial market allows it to attract funds to finance persistent current account deficits.
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Before discussing whether the American foreign debt is sustainable or not -a question that has been fiercely debated during the last twenty five years -let me emphasize the main point, namely: the existence of an international monetary hegemon that controls the international reserve currency implies that the global dependency relations do not suppose international disparities in technology or the ability to produce technology or a monopolistic international market structure, even if those conditions actually exist. McKinnon as the two most prominent defenders of the idea that a dollar crisis is unlikely. 30 A different criticism of dependency is raised by Grosfoguel (2000) , emphasizing the underestimation of culture and the over emphasis on economics and politics within the dependency tradition. The exception would be Anibal Quijano that used the concept of 'coloniality of power' to emphasize the continuity of power relations from colonial to modern times.
An economy whose currency is used in international transactions as unit of account, means of payment and as international reserve, and that provides its currency to satisfy the international needs of trade is in an exceptionally advantageous position. In particular, the currency that acts as international money is well positioned to dominate the debit and credit relations at the heart of the capitalist world system (Rochon and Vernengo, 2003) . These debit and credit transactions are organically connected to the process of capital accumulation. Tavares (1985) was the first to recognize that the old structuralist -as well as the more recent neo-structuralists -got it wrong, and that the end of Bretton Woods did not represent the end of American hegemonic cycle, but quite the opposite, and that the diplomacy of the dollar was the real instrument of power, the technology of power so to speak. 32 Tavares (2000, p. 133) notes that dollar diplomacy forced Latin America into a longue dureé crisis, whose end is still not in sight. 33 In particular, Tavares notes that the technological division of labor in which the periphery concentrates in the production of commodities for the center, while the latter produces manufacturing goods for the former is of very limited historical relevance. Industrialization and technical progress in the periphery was not sufficient to break the dependency ties with the center. The financial dependency reflected in the inability of peripheral countries to borrow in of labor, and the surplus extraction from the periphery is greatly reduced in explaining dependency. Arrighi (1994, p. 33) In that respect, the external debt crises of peripheral countries are a recurrent phenomenon, a characteristic of the center-periphery interaction. Suter (1989) compares the debt-cycles to the long waves of technological innovation often referred to as Kondratieff or Kuznets cycles. Technological dependency -the inability to generate autonomous technological innovations -although important, is subsidiary and financial dependency -the inability to borrow in its own currency -is central.
Keynes presented in his
Further, one should note that the reverse position, that of the international hegemon is not without risks. Arrighi (1994, pp. 27-28) investors. In a world without alternatives, the risks are relatively limited, and in 34 The inability to borrow in its own currency has been dubbed the 'original sin' in more conservative circles (Hausmann, 1999) . 35 In fact, the U.S. has basically followed a monetary policy that privileges domestic issues. In a recession interest rates are drastically reduced, and then raised as recovery goes on. The dollar has then fluctuated over medium term cycles, associated to interest rate variations at home. On the other hand, countries in the periphery are generally forced to hike interest rates in the midst of a recession. In other words, center countries can pursue counter-cyclical policies, while peripheral countries in general cannot.
that respect the appearance of the Euro in 1999 increases the dangers of the American foreign exposure.
However, one must note that transitions from one hegemonic international currency to another are slow processes, and there are several reasons to believe that the relatively short-lived run of the dollar is not near the end. Serrano (2003) notes about a third of the American current account deficit with foreign residents is in fact due to imports from subsidiaries of American multinationals. Foreign debt to GDP -which is denominated in domestic currency for the U.S. -is still at low levels by international standards. Given the incredible relevance of the dollar as vehicle currency in international trade and the inertia implicit in those institutional arrangements it will certainly not have any difficulty in finding sellers in international markets willing to accept dollars as payment for its imports. More importantly, for the purposes of understanding dependency theory, even if at some point in the near (or distant) future there is a switch towards the Euro, or any other contender, it is clear that financial dependency in the periphery will not disappear with the fall of the dollar.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Financial hegemony eliminates the balance of payments constraint and allows the dominant country to grow foreign exchange limitations. In fact, the hegemonic country not only provides the international reserve currency, but also is the main provider of global effective demand. This would suggest that if the balance of payments is the main constraint on growth for the periphery, then restrictions on domestic demand growth are the main limitation to growth in the hegemonic country. 36 This view contrasts with mainstream authors -and several 36 This was exactly the point of Baran and Sweezy (1966) stagnation thesis. In fact, Baran and Sweezy shift the focus of the limits to capitalism from the supply side, the falling rate of profit, to the demand side, the realization crises. In that respect, they are in line with the demand-oriented approach first raised by Sweezy in his debate with Dobb on the transition to capitalism. Their heterodox ones too -that consider that supply side constraints are the main limitation on growth not only for the periphery, but also for developed countries.
In the alternative view, then, demand-led growth is possible because it does also affect the supply side restriction. Demand expansion by forcing the economy to work at near full capacity promotes technical progress. As the saying goes "necessity is the mother of invention." That is, economies that are under pressure of increasing demand need to create new processes of production, new forms of organization and new products to be ahead of demand. The technical developments in turn generate higher levels of output and income, which translate in a new expansion of the demand, and a cumulative process of accumulation follows.
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According to this view policies that promote full employment and demand growth are desirable, since they are self-reinforcing. In the case of the hegemonic country the balance of payments does not impose a limit on demand expansion.
In the case of the periphery, export-led growth is the only source of demand growth that does not lead to recurrent balance of payments problems. Not surprisingly several authors have described the East Asian experience as a case of the Smithian vent for surplus theory, in which foreign markets provide an outlet for domestic production, promoting demand-expansion and higher levels of productivity growth. Davidson, 1990 ). Verdoorn's Law underscores the idea that growth promotes technical progress. For a discussion of the Cambridge origins of cumulative causation see Vernengo and Rochon (2001) . 38 Brenner (1977) noted the neo-Smithian elements of those that emphasized the role of demand, and world markets in the process of development, albeit in a critical perspective.
A caveat though is important at this point. Export-led expansion as a development strategy for the periphery is not a panacea. If the neo-Marxist 'dependencistas' exaggerated the tendency to stagnation, and the structuralists saw the possibilities of growth associated with integration with world markets, then the limitations of the latter perspective are worth noticing. Export-led growth is limited by the growth of world markets, which is ultimately highly dependent on the expansion of central countries. Also, in a world with relative open capital accounts, peripheral countries would be forced to keep interest rates too high, in order to attract capital flows, and/or avoid capital flight. High interest rates then lead to contractionary forces that may very well overwhelm any expansionary force from external markets. For that reason export-led strategies would be more successful in 'Bretton Woods' like environments, in which capital controls are widespread.
In that respect, many Latin American structuralists have moved to emphasize the need to reform the international financial system to provide the conditions for demand-led growth to flourish in the region once again (e.g. Ocampo, 2000) .
The financial turmoil of the 1990s generated a deep sense that reforms on the structure of the international financial system were needed. 39 This contrasts with the positions from the extreme right and the extreme left that would prefer a complete revolution in the international financial system, eliminating the IMF, and other multilateral institutions. Reform of international financial institutions, rather than a complete overhaul is a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition for the renovation of the process of development in the periphery. In that respect, the reformist tendencies of the structuralist version of dependency rather than the 39 Although Ocampo was the Secretary General of CEPAL, there is no official document that shows that the institution is committed to reforming international finance, which would represent an important break with the long term emphasis on trade and technology issues privileged by CEPAL. Bresser Pereira (2000, p. 20) points out that at this point there is no clear consensus on development strategies, but everybody would agree that the growth with foreign debt strategy is a very dangerous one. Bresser, however, does not take the next step in arguing for a more closed international financial environment.
revolutionary element of the neo-Marxist approach seems to be dominant in Latin
American radical political economy. On the other hand, the structuralist optimism in the internal ability to break with dependency, has given place to the more pessimistic neo-Marxist emphasis on external factors, financial dependency in particular, in perpetuating the cycle of dependency.
In sum, the reduced relevance of strict definitions of the technological division of labor, and the theoretical problems caused by the effective industrialization of several countries in the periphery, shows that trade and technological dependency are less important. In the era of globalization and great transformations in the international economy the 'new' dependency seems to be financial in nature.
